Liversidge v Sir John Anderson: HL 3 Nov Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Abdi, Same v Same. In Rex v. Leman Street Police Station Inspector (1) it was held that art. an order made by Sir John Anderson as Home Secretary on May 26, , under reg. There was a 4/5 ruling AGAINST Liversidge in , it was ruled that no court can investigate whether the Secretary of State had reasonable.

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The statute has authorized it to be conferred on a Secretary of State, one of the high officers of State who, by reason of his position, is entitled to public confidence in his capacity and integrity, who is answerable to Parliament for his conduct in office and who has access to exclusive sources of information. Balchin 1cited with approval by my noble and anxerson friend Lord Wright in Barnard v. Halliday 1 are, in my judgment, equally applicable to reg.

Before that court the appellant abandoned his claim to have para. My Lords, the objection is answered by the very terms of the regulation itself. Conceivably, in a proper case, the judge might at that stage make some order by way of particulars of the allegations of the defendants.

To require that a cause of belief shall be reasonable necessarily implies a reference to some standard of reasonableness. Secretary of State for Home Affairs 1 are undoubtedly of anderrson force, but to accede to them would, or might in certain cases, lead to a result that neither Parliament nor the framers of the regulation could by any possibility have intended.

It is a curious fact that in both cases in the first emergence of the issues raised no trace of this contention appeared. There adnerson, it seems, an external condition in that respect.

It concerns civil liberties and the separation of powers. In any case, neither the appellant nor the respondent was satisfied with the half-way house. This seems to me, with respect, to be fantastic. There are as many as twenty-three and I take them in numerical order, but it will be obvious to which class they belong. On reasonable suspicion a deserter or absentee without leave may be arrested without warrant.

I turn now to the nature of the topics as to which the Secretary of State is under the regulation to have reasonable cause of belief. Clearly in those cases the constable is not to be judge in his own cause. Every judge who dealt with the case, including the noble Lords, refused to limit the natural liversidgf of the words, liverxidge out that a state of war would itself tend to confine the construction to the plain meaning of the words and would discourage any attempt to make the words lean in favour of liberty.

If the respondents were able to satisfy the court that they could not give particulars in the public interest, the court would either not order particulars or, if the objection came after the order, would not enforce it. He employs the language of Atkin, that, in addition to an officer’s subjective belief that there are reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view.


Liversage v Anderson [1942]

If any person refuses to give his name or address or is suspected of giving a false name or address or of intending to abscond the constable may arrest him without warrant. My Lords, it is, I think, apt to lead to confusion if the question be regarded as one of onus. It must be remembered that at the time of the issue of the regulation organizations of both left and right were under suspicion, and there may well have been good reasons for granting protection to persons who had merely at some time or other been members of them without more.

Lastly, on this question of expediency I would recall that for months after the regulation came into force this suggested difficulty never presented itself to the minds of the Home Secretary and his advisers, but, on the contrary, in Rex v. But it seemed to be suggested in argument that, even if the power were conditional, yet it would be a good return by the Secretary of State to say that he had made the order in the terms of the regulation.

Could the Home Secretary support a mere order to detain all persons of hostile origin regardless of age, sex or antecedents? It is not competent to us to investigate what political reasons necessitated this change, but it is at least probable that it was made because objection had been taken to the arbitrary power and it was seen that Parliament might intervene.

State of Madraswhere the court held that the subjective test was to be applied. The respondents lodged a defence admitting that Sir John Anderson ordered that the appellant should be detained under reg.

The argument by contrast is of little assistance in the present instance, for the regulations have observed no uniformity of language. As was said by Lord Finlay L. The action is one of damages for false imprisonment, but the appellant nowhere states categorically that he has been wrongly imprisoned or in what respect the order in consequence and by reason of which he says he has been detained is illegal, irregular or defective.

There was no evidence of this kind at the hearing of this summons, and, in my opinion, the appeal ought to be allowed and an order made in the terms of the summons. I shall in due course examine that case which raises technical questions on the law. Hakes 2especially by Lord Halsbury L. However, subsequent decisions such as Fazal Ghosi v.

Liversidge v Anderson by Ellie Wonnacott on Prezi

Garbutt 4 and Alman v. Nevertheless, says the appellant, he must accept the decision of a court of law, however contrary to his own view. The appellant claims that he is entitled to explore the mind of the Secretary of State in order to find out what was the state of his information, in the hope that when this is revealed it may prove to be such that the court will hold it not to afford a reasonable cause for the belief which the Secretary of State professed to entertain, when judged by the standard of the ordinary reasonable man.


The appellant, accordingly, seeks to throw on the respondents the burden of justifying the order. Take, for instance, the case of a person against whom an order for detention has been made because the Secretary of State believes him to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm. On that issue the judge must decide. Morrison, an injunction ahderson the continued detention and imprisonment of the appellant.


My noble friend, Lord Macmillan, suggests liversifge under a more exacting system of pleading the appellant would have to aver the absence of reasonable grounds on the part of the Secretary of State. It is, therefore, proper to consider with what object the regulation was made. For the purposes of this regulation, there shall be one or more advisory committees consisting of persons appointed by the Secretary of State; aderson any person aggrieved by the making of an order against him, by a refusal of the Secretary of State to suspend the operation of such an order, by any condition attached to a direction given by the Secretary of State or by anderxon revocation of any such direction, under the powers conferred by this regulation, may make his objections to such a committee.

That court held that the abderson at the present stage was not entitled to any of the particulars he was claiming and the appeal was dismissed, but, having regard to the great importance of the questions arising out of orders for detention under reg.

I will deal with the suggested inconvenience to the minister or possible prejudice to the interests of the State later on. It would be obviously undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law or otherwise discussed in public. This is true enough, but they go to show that the regulation is dealing with an executive discretion, in the exercise of which the discretion of the minister is final.

It does not in terms provide for review by the court. The order on its face purports to be made under the regulation and it states that the Secretary of State had reasonable cause to believe the facts in question. In their view, it was not appropriate for a court to deal with matters of national security, especially as they were not privy to classified information that only the executive had. c

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